The regulatory choice for controlling production externalities under imperfect competition is complex because market mechanisms influence the risk allocation. A Pigovian tax or/and a penalty on accident, allocated either to the compensation of victims (liability) or to the regulator budget, are financial instruments that aim at internalizing a damage. The main difference between a Pigovian tax and a penalty is that the tax is collected ex ante whatever the accident event. If the tax is not paid, a firm is not able to engage in the activity.
Conversely, the penalty is paid ex post, that is, only in the case of an accident event and if the wealth of firms is high enough to cover the penalty. Indeed, a firm may avoid paying the penalty because of insufficient profits (or wealth) coming from its economic activity.
The efficiency of any penalty/liability system is often faced with the judgmentproof problem (Shavell, 1986) : the insolvency of firms impedes a complete payment of the liability fee. According to the Superfund Progress Report (1998), "at almost every Superfund site, some parties responsible for contamination cannot be found, have gone out of business, or are non longer financially able to contribute to cleanup efforts". Carroll et al. (2002) This article seeks to answer the question: should regulators rely on taxation or on penalties in order to limit dangerous activities? The impacts of a penalty and a tax policy are detailed in a market context (Cournot competition) and compared with the position of a regulator who seeks to maximize welfare, taking into account firm's profits, consumer surplus, social damages and government revenue. We abstract from the amount of care undertaken by firms for focusing on the level of output selected by firms. In case of accident, the social damages depend on the output of firms, so that quantities and prices may be influenced by the selected regulation. Under a penalty regime, the financial situation of a firm, that is either solvent or insolvent in case of accident, depends on the market context. The characterization of the socially optimal policy we provide in this paper contributes to the understanding of limitations in liability awards (as established by the CLC, for instance).
The market mechanisms linked to a given level of penalty are first detailed.
A higher operating profit of firms results in an increased ability to pay the penalty in case of damage. The penalty is paid ex post, only if the accident occurs and if the profit (equal to the wealth) of firms is high enough to cover the penalty. For medium values of the penalty, the output strategy of firms may influence their profit that determines their financial situation in case of accident.
This results in multiple equilibria, where one possible equilibrium is the solvent output for all firms and the other one is the insolvent Cournot equilibrium.
Under the solvent Cournot equilibrium, the penalty is totally covered, whereas it is partially covered under the insolvent Cournot equilibrium.
With respect to the socially optimal policy, the results are the following. If the expected damage is relatively low or/and the market structure is concentrated, the absence of intervention is optimal since price/quantity distortions are avoided. This is consistent with previous results on taxation (Buchanan, 1969) and liability (Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983 ) under imperfect competition. For medium values of the damage, an optimal penalty and an optimal tax equivalently allow an internalization of the damage. The levels of penalty or tax are positive and proportional to the value of the damage. When the expected damage is large, the judgment-proof problem (firms' inability to fully pay the penalty after an accident) limits the financial penalty. Should that happen, a limited penalty is dominated from a welfare standpoint by a per-unit tax. Insolvency problems do not arise if a tax is implemented, since the tax is mandatory for producing. Taxation is sufficient for maximizing welfare and reducing consumption. These results suggest that for regulating dangerous activities with potential high expected damages, a per-unit tax is the most appropriate instrument for insolvent firms. In the oil spill context, the IOPCF activity should be reinforced and completed. This is is the case in Europe with the creation of the Polinsky and Shavell (1994) or Hamilton (1998) studied different liability rules in a market context without considering the endogenous insolvency in case of accident. Tax and penalty are equivalent when firms expect to be solvent and the multiplicity of equilibria in a context of strategic interaction is overlooked in the literature. In our paper, the judgment-proof (or insolvency) problem under penalty is considered as endogenous to the market structure, explaining some limits regarding the optimal financial penalty. Moreover, in a context where no market effect is considered, Boyd and Ingberman (1994) and Lewis and Sappington (1999) have shown that an optimal penalty aims at reducing the potential scale of losses or the probability of accident. Our paper departs from these results since in our setting the limited penalty aims at limiting quantity/price distortions coming from the judgment-proof problem.
In Lewis and Sappington (1999) , the optimality of penalties decoupled from realized damages was underlined in a case where social damages do not depend on firms quantity. Our results differ from theirs for large values of the damage, since they recommended the delivery of the entire assets of the firm to the victims, while we recommend a limited penalty to circumvent the judgment-proof problem.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2.
The influence of the level of penalty on firms' production choice is described in section 3. The optimal regulation, allowing for ex ante taxation or ex post penalties is detailed in section 4. Some extensions and conclusions are drawn in sections 5 and 6.
The model
We begin with a Cournot framework with risky products, where social damages depend on the output of firms. A three-stages oligopoly model is considered with a regulator who maximizes the welfare. Firms as well as the third party incurring all the loss (externalities) are risk neutral.
The game
In stage 1, the regulator chooses (a) a production ban, (b) a per-unit tax t paid before producing in stage 2 and whatever the accident event, and (c) a per-unit penalty f paid by the injurer in the case of damage in stage 3. 2 For simplicity, there is no uncertainty regarding f or t, perfectly known to firms. The penalty or the tax may be allocated either to victims' compensation or to the regulator budget : this is neutral from a welfare standpoint (see the appendix).
In stage 2, n identical firms pay the tax owed to the regulator. If the tax is not paid, a firm is not able to engage in the activity. The n identical firms simultaneously select a quantity (i.e., Cournot competition). They sell a homogeneous product to consumers with an inverse demand p = a − Q, where Q denotes the quantities (equal to the production) and p denotes the market price.
The parameter a > 0 is the maximum per-unit willingness to pay by consumers and it positively influences the profits of firms.
Damages entailed by the production/consumption are perfectly revealed at the beginning of stage 3. For each firm, a damage may occur with a probability
(1 − λ) for all its products (λ denotes the per-firm probability of no damage).
d ≥ 0 denotes the per-unit social damage linked to the accident. The expected damage for a firm is (1 − λ)dq i , where q i denotes the output of firm i. The probability λ is given (this assumption will be discussed at the end of the paper).
Even if the probability λ is the same for the n firms, the occurrence of an accident for each firm is independent from that of the other firms. In this model, the only uncertainty comes from the accident outcome with a probability (1 − λ).
The regulator knows the value of d and (1 − λ) for selecting f or t in stage 1. In stage 3, in case of accident, the regulator imposes a per-unit penalty f on firms.
The regulator is able to perfectly identify the responsible firm and to verify the extent of the damage, d, without any cost. We consider that the assets available for paying the penalty only come from the firm's profit. For simplicity, there is no cost of regulation.
Before turning to the characterization of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game, we describe how a potential penalty can influence firms' production choice.
since such instruments do not influence the output of firms.
The penalty and firms' output strategy
As the regulator is able to perfectly identify the responsible firm and to verify the extent of the damage, the per-unit penalty f > 0 is imposed by the regulator on the firm responsible for an accident (stage 3). Firms take into account this perunit penalty f in their profits for their quantity choice (stage 2). Corresponding welfares, defined as the sum of profits, consumers surpluses, social damage and government revenue from the penalty, are given in appendix.
The quantity decision depends on the solvency situation of the firm i for paying the penalty f q i in case of damage. Indeed, when the firm has insufficient earnings, unabling it to totally cover the penalty, the firm is said judgment proof (or insolvent). In that case, it is considered that the firm partially covers the penalty. Otherwise, the firm is solvent. As we shall see, the objective function of a solvent firm is distinct from the objective function of a judgment-proof firm.
To derive these profit functions (general formulation), we will consider that firms may have to pay a unit tax as well as a per-unit penalty in the accident event.
The comparison between the gross profit margin, namely the market price minus the per-unit tax, (p − t), and the imposed per-unit penalty f determines the financial situation of a firm in case of damage. For p − t > f , each firm is solvent and fully covers the penalty. The firm is judgment proof if p − t < f, and partially covers the penalty up to the level of its gross profits (p − t)q i , where q i denotes the output of the firm i. Each firm rationally expects its potential financial situation, that will influence its behavior.
The per-firm profit according to the different events is now detailed. For each firm i, with a probability λ, no damage occurs and the gross profit is [p − t]q i .
With a probability (1 − λ), the damage linked to the firm production occurs.
For the solvent firm able to cover the fine, the profit is [p − t − f ]q i . For the insolvent firm, the profit is zero since its gross profit is seized for covering at least one part of the penalty.
Let us denote Q = q i + q −i , with q −i = n−1 j=1 q j representing the output of the other sellers j = i. Depending on the solvency situation, the ex ante expected profits are determined before the revelation of the damage. For p − t > f , the net ex ante expected profit of a solvent firm is
The profit function of a potential solvent firm is influenced by the level of tax as well as the level of penalty. For p − t < f, the net ex ante expected profit for a judgment-proof (or insolvent) firm writes
Note that the value of profit π jp i (q i , q −i ) is influenced by the level of tax and not by the level of penalty f .
Cournot-quantity equilibria under solvency and insolvency are detailed in appendix. At equilibrium with solvent (respectively insolvent) firms in case of accident, each firm has no incentive to deviate unilaterally by selecting a quantity leading to an insolvent (respectively solvent) situation in case of damage.
The penalty and market mechanisms
In this section, we focus on the complex effects coming from the choice of penalty in a market context. The level of penalty influences the firms' production choice and in turn their potential financial situation. The higher the ouput, the lower the profits available for compensation in the accident event. We set the per-unit tax to zero, t = 0, in order to focus on market mechanisms with a penalty.
The multiplicity of equilibria
The following proposition characterizes the relationship between the level of penalty, the firms' production choice and their solvency situation. Let See the proof in Appendix.
As firms are identical, they choose the same equilibrium strategy. The higher the operating profit relatively to the penalty, the more firms are likely to be able to pay the penalty in case of a damage revealed in stage 3 after the output decision in stage 2. For relatively low values of the penalty, f, compared with the profit parameter, a, firms are solvent whatever their possible quantity choice.
Profits are high enough to cover a relatively low level of penalty: only the solvent Cournot equilibrium prevails. Each firm has no incentive to deviate unilaterally by selecting a quantity leading to an insolvent situation in the case of damage.
The expected penalty is internalized by the market via the quantity/price. Conversely, for relatively high values of the penalty, f , compared with the profit parameter, a, firms are judgment proof whatever their possible quantity choice.
Profits are insufficient to cover the damage: only the judgment-proof Cournot equilibrium arises. Each firm has no incentive to deviate unilaterally by selecting a quantity leading to solvency, with the selection of a small quantity coming from the internalization of a large expected penalty. The expected penalty is not internalized by the market via the quantity/price. As the penalty is conditional on the ex post accident, firms do not consider this value of f when they select a quantity under a judgment-proof equilibrium. In these two configurations, the strategic choice of quantity does not influence the (in)solvency situation of the firms.
For medium values of penalty f compared with the profit, the quantity choice (via the price) may influence the financial situation of firms. A large (respectively low) quantity selected by each firm entails a relatively low (respectively high) price, that is insufficient (respectively sufficient) for covering the damage.
This results in multiple equilibria, where one possible equilibrium is the solvent output for all firms and the other one is the judgment-proof Cournot equilibrium for all firms. With the other firms following one strategy, no firm has any incentive to deviate unilaterally in order to select the alternative strategy. 3 For a given value of the penalty f, the quantity under the solvent equilibrium is lower than the quantity under the insolvent (judgment-proof) equilibrium, since the expected penalty is internalized with solvent firms. These equilibria correspond to different levels of penalty paid by firms (and received by a government or a fund for victims): under the solvent Cournot equilibrium, the penalty is totally paid, whereas it is partially covered under the insolvent equilibrium. An increase in the number of firms, n, leads to a decrease of f 1 and f 2 . A more intense competition reduces the profits and the ability to fully cover the penalty in case of damage.
The problem under the judgment-proof equilibrium is the absence of internalization of the penalty supposed to take into account the expected damage.
The equilibrium situation with either solvent or insolvent firms depends on the optimal penalty f selected by the regulator.
The optimal penalty
In this section, the optimal level of penalty is determined for a tax t = 0.
The regulator maximizes the welfare, defined by the sum of expected profits, consumers surplus and penalty revenues minus the overall expected damage (see where firms select the equilibrium leading to the highest profit (see the appendix for details). Consider f 2 defined in (4) and let
Proposition 2: In the case of damage, the socially optimal penalty is (i) the absence of penalty ( f Proof: see the appendix. When the value of the damage, d, is relatively low (see figure 1) , the internalization via the price is not optimal, so that the penalty is f * = 0. Indeed the absence of internalization limits the quantity distortion coming from the market power (with solvent firms), while the damage linked to the accident is not high.
This explains why the absence of any penalty payment dominates any positive value of penalty despite the firms' solvency. Avoiding the internalization of the cost of accident limits the price distortion due to firms' market power (see e.g.
Calabresi (1961), Buchanan (1969) and Polinsky and Rogerson (1983)).
For medium values of d, a positive level of penalty (0 < f * < d for a finite value of n) allows to partially internalize the damage with solvent firms. The penalty increases with d and n, since it aims at not amplifying the quantity/price distortion resulting from imperfect competition.
When d is relatively large, firms would be insolvent with a penalty f * > 0.
It is optimal to select a positive level of penalty f 2 − ε < f * (with f 2 given by (4)), for which firms are solvent without any incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. This level f 2 − ε does not depend on the damage d, since this is the highest level of penalty for which no firm deviates when the other firms are solvent. Firms are solvent with f 2 − ε, which leads to lower levels of production and expected damage compared to a judgment-proof situation, where any penalty f > f 2 − ε would not be internalized in the quantity choice. A level of penalty that impedes insolvency is necessary for limiting the output level and the scope of the damage that is linked to the output. The optimal policy f 2 − ε aims at avoiding the judgment-proof situation.
For very large values of d, the welfare is negative with a penalty f 2 − ε, so that banning the production is the best policy. It means that liability with an optimal penalty is inefficient for regulating the risk. penalty takes into account the possibility of insolvency, so that the judgmentproof problem is eliminated at the optimum. From these results, it appears that a strict liability rule with a penalty equal to the damage is never optimal when the social damage depends on produced quantities.
We eventually consider the impact of the variation in the number of firms, n. A more intense competition reduces the profits and the ability to fully cover the penalty in case of damage. An increase in the number of firms, n, results in lowering frontiers d 1 , d 2 and d 3 . The level f 2 − ε decreases with n, since the judgment proof equilibrium becomes more attractive. Note that when n → +∞,
, and the optimal penalty f 2 − ε → 0. This means that in a competitive environment, the optimal policy would be to ban production if d is large (d > 
The optimal regulation
We now turn to the socially optimal regulation by allowing the regulator to select either an ex post penalty in case of accident, as detailed in section 3, or a per-unit tax t > 0 which is paid ex ante by all firms, whatever the later outcome about the accident. Considering the tax allows to complete the analysis. Let
Proposition 3: The socially optimal policy is (i) the absence of penalty or tax (
(ii) either a positive level of penalty f * or a positive level of tax t *
Proof: see the appendix. 
Extensions
In defining the analytical framework, very restrictive assumptions were made for simplicity. Extensions to a dynamic context or with injurers differing in size and/or wealth are not treated here. However, the following extensions could be considered.
(i ) In this model, the regulator knows the value of d and (1 − λ) for selecting f or t in stage 1. However, this information is often difficult to get, which limits the ability of the regulator to impose a tax compatible with proposition 3. In this case, penalties or strict liability are useful to sanction and regulate an unpredictable damage. However, propositions 1 and 2 underscore some limits of penalties or liability coming from the judgment proof problem. In this case, the regulator should focus on the profitability of firms and the insurance program so as to be sure that some assets exist in case of unpredictable damage. Whatever the magnitude of the financial penalty depending on the welfare objectives (detailed in proposition 2), the judgment-proof problem has to be dodged for large values of social damages. In this case, the optimal penalty directly depends on the possibility of firms to be judgment proof. This suggests that considerations regarding financial aspects such as firms balance sheets and firms' shares prices on the stock market (...), as well as sectorial characteristics, may be important for shaping environmental regulations.
(ii ) Our analysis showed that the optimal penalty should be capped in order to avoid a situation with judgment-proof firms. For a risky industry, (in)solvency is sometimes very difficult to evaluate when a regulation is implemented, since it depends on many factors. We assumed that the regulator and the court were acting with perfect information about the firms' characteristics or the damage.
One extension could examine the consequences of imperfect information about the damage and/or the effort, which could reduce the efficiency of liability due to the cost of inspection and/or expertise. 4 Note that the regulator failure may lead to underestimate the damage, which would result in a capped penalty defined by regulation.
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(iii ) Throughout the model, we maintain the assumption of a damage de-4 It would be interesting to see if, in our framework, uncertainty would make liability a complementary regulation of taxation, as predicted by Kolstad et al (1990) , instead of an imperfect substitute. 5 We abstract from any positive costs of litigation/regulation studied by Rubinfeld (1984) .
pending on the produced quantity. For a damage independent of produced quantities, the judgment-proof problem still holds. In this case, an analysis could be developed in which the penalty is capped to avoid the judgment-proof problem.
(iv ) No possibility of private or public financial assurance was considered for relaxing the judgment-proof constraint. Insurance (or financial markets) may be introduced, so that firms, integrating the insurance coverage in their solvency constraint, could be solvent for a level of penalty greater than f 2 given by (4).
However, for very large values of the per-unit damage, d, firms and insurance companies could be insolvent, a problem which should be taken into account by the regulator. In this case also, a strict liability rule with a penalty equal to the damage and the negligence rule do not correspond to the optimal policy. Consider the effort choice to reduce the risk, where few assumptions are added up. Before the production choice stage, each firm chooses whether or not to implement a costly prevention effort (observable by the regulator). This effort, equal to λ for simplicity, influences a marginal cost c = c(λ) that is increasing (c > 0), strictly convex (c > 0) and such that c(1) → +∞. For t * > 0, the first-best welfare W * s (q s , λ, n, 0, t * ) given in the proof of the proposition 3 (see the appendix) can
the inverse function of the marginal cost function, let
which is the level imposed via a mandatory standard if
A standard λ * is selected with the optimal policy presented in proposition 3.
the tax is zero due to market power, leading to a lower welfare than the first- 6 The negligence rule shifts the damage to the injurer only if the injurer does not exert a minimum level of effort.
best welfare W * s (q s , λ, n, 0, t * ) given in the proof of proposition 3. In this case a standard lower than λ * limits the marginal cost c(λ) and allows to approach the first-best welfare.
(vi ) Eventually, we considered that the regulator was acting in the public's best interest. One stumbling block for such regulatory "fairness" is the efficiency of the public regulatory authority itself. Public agencies may be doomed to failure if their mandate is not clearly delineated or they suffer from bureaucracy.
Appendix
Profits and welfare are presented, before detailing the proof of propositions 1, 2 and 3.
By using (2), profit maximization when firm i expects to be judgment-proof results in the following reactin function :
for all i. It follows that a judgment-proof Cournot equilibrium is an output vector q jp = (q jp i , ..., q jp i ) with
The equilibrium price is p jp = a − nq jp i . At equilibrium, all firms are judgmentproof for f > p jp − t. The per-firm profit is
Using the overall quantities nq jp , and the equilibrium price p jp = a − nq jp , consumers' expected surplus is,
Under strict liability, the welfare with judgment-proof firms is W * 7 Recall that all the profit of a firm, (p jp − t)q
is seized for penalty in case of damage. The fact that the penalty or the tax are allocated either to victims compensation or to the regulator budget is neutral from the welfare point of view. Then
By using (1), profit maximization under the solvent situation gives firm i reaction function,
for all i. It follows that a solvent Cournot equilibrium is an output vector
The equilibrium price is p s = a − nq s i . At equilibrium, all firms are solvent for f < p s − t. The per-firm profit is
Using the overall quantities nq s i , and the equilibrium price p s = a − nq s i , consumers' expected surplus is,
The welfare is W * s (q s , λ, n, f, t) = nπ 
We now turn to to the proofs of propositions.
Proof of proposition 1
Recall that we consider the tax t = 0. Consider that each firm has two pure strategies. We start by detailing the multiple equilibria case (iii ).
(iii) Two Cournot-Nash equilibria exist simultaneously, one in which all firms are solvent and one in which all firms insolvency risk exists, if the following conditions are satisfied:
The condition (22) 
where the notations were previously detailed. This conditions (24) means that each seller has an incentive to deviate from a situation, where all other sellers would choose the quantity q jp j (defined by (13)) leading to an insolvency risk. The conditions (22) and (24) are satisfied if f < f 1 (< f 2 ). In this case, all firms are solvent, namely f < p s , when all firms select q s j defined by (18) . (ii) Finally, for the judgment-proof Cournot outcome to be the unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that (23) holds with,
where the notations were previously detailed. This conditions (25), means that each seller has an incentive to deviate from a situation, where all other sellers would choose the quantity q 
Proof of proposition 2:
Recall that we consider t = 0.
Point (i ). The maximization of the concave function W * s (q s , λ, n, f, 0) leads to f * given by (8) . This fee is lower than zero for d < d 1 so that the optimal penalty is f
Point (ii ). We now detail conditions for which f * leads to a solvency situation for firms. The case of multiple equilibria underlined in proposition 1 arises for a penalty f such that f 1 < f < f 2 . The equilibrium is selected ac- (by using expressions (19) and (14)). As a/(1 + √ λ) > f 2 , the solvent equilibrium is preferred by firms when f 1 < f < f 2 . The level of penalty f 2 is such that condition (22) 
and is greater than the judgment-proof welfare W * jp (q jp , λ, n, 0). Indeed, the equality W * s (q s , λ, n, f 2 − ε, 0) ≥ W * jp (q jp , λ, n, 0) leads to a constraint d ≥ d = a(2− √ λ+n)
(1−λ)[ √ λ(n−1)+2](1+n)
. As d < d 2 , the inequality W * s (q s , λ, n, f 2 − ε, 0) ≥ W * jp (q jp , λ, n, 0) holds as soon as f 2 − ε is selected.
Point (iv ). W * s (q s , λ, n, f 2 − ε, 0) < 0 for d > d 3 . Eventually, the inequality d 1 < d 2 < d 3 always holds whatever a, λ, t, n, which completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 3
We first detail the choice of t, when f = 0. The selection of t is such that ∂W * s (q s , λ, n, 0, t)/∂t = 0, which leads to the selection of a per-unit tax t * given by (9) . 8 This tax is lower than zero for d < d 1 so that the optimal penalty is t * = 0 for 
